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I 
 
he distinction between being (Sein) and ought (Sollen)1 is among the most 
classic of the history of philosophy, and the criticisms it has undergone are 
just as classic. Consider, for example, Hegel’s rejection of the is/ought separa-
tion, which the young Marx takes over and applies to his conception of communism; 
moreover, scholars like Schopenhauer have criticized the concept of ought, confining 
it within the scope of a theological ethics, and others, like Nietzsche, have rejected it, 
replacing it with the will to power. 
The conceptions of ought developed by Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) and by 
his pupil France Veber (1890–1975) are much less known than those of the authors 
just mentioned. However, examining them is interesting not only because they have 
so far received little attention – which is especially true of Veber – but mainly for 
theoretical and historical reasons. These conceptions are antithetical to those which 
refuse to use the notion of ought, and propose instead a special understanding of the 
relationship between being and ought, insofar as they claim that the latter is an ob-
ject, and therefore a part of being. From a historical point of view, such an analysis 
                                                 
1 Following the common use, I translate Sollen with ‘ought’; although there are linguistic reasons for using 
quotes when the term is taken as a noun, I shall omit them for ease of reading. Occasionally, I also use the 
word ‘obligation’. Meinong’s works are quoted from the Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe (1968–1978), 
abbreviated as GA. Translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise; references to English translations 
appear in brackets. 
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sheds new light on how work was conducted within the Graz school, showing how 
fruitful was the dialogue between the teacher and the pupil for the elaboration of their 
respective theories; this may be deduced especially from the two texts on which I 
will mainly focus my attention, Meinong’s Über emotionale Präsentation and 
Veber’s Die Natur des Sollens. 
In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber assumes several Meinongian concepts, which 
Meinong illustrated in some of his mature works and, finally, in Über emotionale 
Präsentation. This work was published in 1917, but it was already finished in the 
previous year: on the cover of the printed text, we may read that it was presented at 
the meeting of the Academy of Sciences of Vienna on 18th October 1916. 
Until a few years ago, Die Natur des Sollens posed some problems to scholars 
concerning both the dating and the identification of the text. From 1912 till 1917, 
Veber studied philosophy and classical philology at the University of Graz, and he 
earned his doctoral degree under the supervision of Meinong on 10th February 1917. 
Since the dissertation is missing, a problem arises as to its identification. According 
to Mechtild and Wolfgang Stock, Der Gegenstand Sollen ist zu untersuchen und den 
Grundproblemen der Ethik nutzbar zu machen is the title of the dissertation, of which 
we have only chapter IV; probably – they write – the dissertation is the same as the 
text presented by Veber for the Wartinger Prize. (Stock & Stock, 1990, pp. 758-9; 
Stock W. G., 1992, p. 12) According to Ana Juvančič-Mehle, who quotes a biograph-
ical sketch of Veber written by Anton Terstenjak, the dissertation had as a title Die 
Natur des Gegenstandes Sollen und dessen Beziehungen zum Wert, and was awarded 
the Wartinger Prize. (Juvančič Mehle, 1988, p. 35) Although disagreeing on the title, 
she too accepts that dissertation and Wartinger-Arbeit are one and the same. In 
Christliche Philosophie der Slowenen, Joseph Hlebš expresses a completely different 
opinion: the manuscript which is present in Veber’s Nachlass with the title Einiges 
über die Objektivität der sogenannten “relativen” Werte corresponds to the disserta-
tion and is “an expansion of the so-called Wartinger Preisarbeit.” (Hlebš, 1997, p. 
119) This view is supported by the fact that, in Veber’s Nachlass, the certificate of 
the Hauptrigorosum is attached to this manuscript. On the contrary, Wolfgang L. 
Gombocz excludes that Einiges über die Objektivität can be either the Wartinger-
Arbeit or the dissertation, and hypothesizes that the Wartinger-Arbeit, which is enti-
tled Die Natur des Gegenstandes Sollen und dessen Beziehung zum Wert ist zu unter-
suchen und das Ergebnis womöglich den Grundproblemen der Ethik nutzbar zu ma-
chen, was expanded into the dissertation and that Einiges über die Objektivität was 
its basis. (Gombocz, 1987, pp. 69, 70; 2001, pp. 282-3) In this text, the Wartinger-
Arbeit of 1915/16 is quoted several times, but nowhere is it explicitly identified with 
the dissertation. 
Not even Veber himself was very helpful in solving the riddle, namely, 
whether the Wartinger-Arbeit and the dissertation are two different texts, or one and 
the same work. In Sistem Filozofije (1921) he writes: 
 
Once I presented my thoughts to my teacher, he persuaded me that it would take much more sub-
tle work. Dialoguing almost every day with my teacher and thanks to his constant, constructive 
criticism of all my unfinished thoughts, I went so far that I could bring together all these thoughts 
in 1916 in my ‘work for the Wartinger Prize’, which I have not yet been able to publish, since I 
finished it as a soldier, in the most difficult conditions, and hence to date I have been unable to 
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put it into publishable form. (pp. 72-3) 
 
If in 1921 Veber refers to Die Natur des Sollens calling it not ‘doctoral disser-
tation’, but ‘work for the Wartinger Prize’, this could mean that the two texts are not 
identical. On the other hand, given the very short time – one text was completed by 
February 1916, the other is prior to 10th February 1917, when Veber received his 
PhD – and the fact that Veber was engaged in the first world war as a soldier, it is 
very unlikely that he was able to change his ideas about the ought significantly. 
The publication in 2004 of the text of Die Natur des Sollens und sein Verhält-
nis zum Werte unter kritischer Würdigung namentlich der neusten einschlägigen 
Theorien zu untersuchen und das Ergebnis womöglich den Grundproblemen der 
Ethik nutzbar zu machen, with an appendix containing documents relating to it, at 
last shed light on the whole issue. On the title page of the extant text, we read that the 
work was registered at the Dean’s Office in the Faculty of Philosophy on 28th Febru-
ary 1916. In the afterword, Michael Reichmayr says: 
 
His [Veber’s] dissertation consists of the three chapters of the cited work, begun in 1915 and 
awarded the Wartinger Prize in June 1916, plus a fourth chapter added later by Veber. 
(Reichmayr, 2004, pp. 157-8 / 165) 
 
And in fact the Rigorosum protocol of 17th February 1917 reads: 
 
Following his [Veber’s] application of 9th January 1917, Z. 347, the college of professors of the 
Faculty of Philosophy, at its meeting of 26th January 1917 on the request of professors Hofrat 
Alexius Ritter von Meinong and Dr. Hugo Spitzer, took the unanimous decision: [...] to accept as 
dissertation the work presented by him [Veber] in 1915 and awarded the Wartinger Prize “The 
nature of the object ‘ought’ and its relationship to value should be investigated and the result 
made useful for the fundamental problems of ethics” [...]. (Quoted in the appendix of Weber F., 
2004, p. 177) 
 
Summarizing, the dissertation consists of the three chapters of the Wartinger-
Arbeit plus a fourth one added subsequently, and it was written between 1915 and the 
end of 1916, since the application to obtain his doctorate was submitted by Veber on 
9th January 1917. 
Having clarified the mystery of the dissertation, we can rightly assume that 
Meinong and Veber worked almost simultaneously on their respective texts. Die 
Natur des Sollens presupposes part of the content of Über emotionale Präsentation, 
even though the latter contains theories (like the quadripartite classification of ob-
jects) as yet unknown to the young Veber; but it is possible that the teacher had 
worked them out partly thanks to the exchange of ideas he had with his pupil. It 
should also be considered that, in the years Veber studied in Graz, Meinong held in 
the summer semester 1913 one seminar on his essay “Für die Psychologie und gegen 
den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie”, and two courses on the general 
theory of values, respectively in the winter semester 1913/14 and in the winter se-
mester 1916/17. (Dölling, 1999, pp. 244-5) It is doubtful that Veber was able to at-
tend the latter, but it is very likely that he had attended the previous ones. (Veber, 
1972, p. 157) Moreover, it seems that Meinong selected the nature of the ought as a 
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theme for the Wartinger Prize precisely after the discussions with Veber and the 
suggestions that came from his young pupil.2 
In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber refers explicitly to Meinong, but he does not 
mention any specific writings by Meinong himself or other authors, and the few 
footnotes of his manuscript have been lost; however, it is clear that his theory of 
ought presupposes Meinong’s value theory. This was first illustrated in the Psy-
chologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-Theorie (1894), then in “Über Wert-
haltung und Wert” (1895), in a chapter of Über Annahmen – both in the edition of 
1902 (chap. VIII) and in that of 1910 (chap. IX) –, in “Über Urteilsgefühle: was sie 
sind und was sie nicht sind” (1905) and “Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psy-
chologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie” (1912); finally, with more details, in 
Über emotionale Präsentation. Posthumously, Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen 
Werttheorie (1923) and “Ethische Bausteine” (1968) were published. The whole of 
Meinong’s reflection on value is not isolated, but – as he himself wrote in his 
“Selbstdarstellung” (GA VII, 1921, p. 5 [1974, p. 231]) – it was inspired by Carl 
Menger’s lectures on national economy.3 The relations between Meinong’s value 
theory and that of his pupil Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) – as we read again 
in the “Selbstdarstellung” (GA VII, 1921, p. 10 [1974, p. 234]) – are also important; 
(Ehrenfels, 1893–1894; 1897–1898)4 and, of course, we should not forget Brentano’s 
contribution to the same discipline in Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889). 
(Brentano, 1889)5 As noted by Karl Wolf (Wolf, 1952, p. 157 ff.; 1968, p. 48 ff.), 
Meinong’s theory of values should also be seen in connection with the reflections 
that were being elaborated in his time by the neo-Kantians of the Baden school (Wil-
helm Windelband, Hans Rickert, Bruno Bauch) and by some members of the phe-
nomenological school, first of all Max Scheler, but also Nicolai Hartmann and Diet-
rich von Hildebrand.6 
Within the Graz school, Ernst Mally (1879–1944) (Mally, 1926) and Ernst 
Schwarz (1878–1938) (Schwarz, 1934),7 both of Slovenian origin, also dealt with the 
theory of values and the ought. Unlike his mature works on ethics, Veber’s early 
writings on value theory and, more specifically, the ought, have been largely neglect-
ed by scholars, especially because – as mentioned above – they have only recently 
become available again.8 Therefore, the relationships of the young Veber with the 
                                                 
2 For a reconstruction of these events see Trofenik (1972, pp. 143-4) and Veber (1972, pp. 158-9). 
3 Which were based on Menger (1871). 
4 On Ehrenfels’ value theory see Tacon (2008). 
5 On Brentano’s value theory see Eaton (1930, pp. 51 ff., 61 ff). See also Reimherr (2004/2005), who 
shows that Menger’s and Brentano’s theories of values present many similarities. Also Meinong (GA III, 
1912, p. 278) recognizes an affinity between his own views and those of Brentano; but see Meinong (GA 
III, 1917, pp. 434 fn. 1 [1972, pp. 131 fn. 8]) for a claim of independence from Brentano. 
6 For a survey of these researches see Donise (2008, pp. 14-9, 32-114). 
7 See especially pp. 73-126, which are dedicated to the Soll. 
8 To my knowledge, the only text which deals with Die Natur des Sollens is Marini (2011, pp. 85-144). 
The Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische Philosophie of Graz holds Veber’s 
Nachlass, which contains, among others, seminar works and writings of the years 1912–1918 on the 
theory of values and of ought. On Veber’s Nachlass see Gombocz (1987, pp. 69-73) and Marini (2011, pp. 
597-611). 
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Graz school, namely with Meinong, Ehrenfels, Mally and Schwarz, still need to be 
investigated.9 The pages that follow are intended to contribute to this line of research. 
 
II 
 
In order to understand both Meinong’s and Veber’s concepts of ought, we have to 
start from the notions of object and of intentionality. According to Meinong, for 
something to be an object does not mean being concrete like perceptual things, but 
being independent from the subject. The object is the logical prius. Intentionality 
means the relationship whereby each mental experience is directed to an object. For 
Meinong, all mental experiences are either intellectual or emotional; the first group 
consists of representations and thoughts (i.e., judgments and assumptions), the se-
cond one of feelings and desires. Since each mental experience has an object, 
Meinong introduces also the objects of feelings and desires, which he calls respec-
tively ‘dignitatives’ and ‘desideratives’. This conception may at first seem strange, 
but – as John N. Findlay remarked (1963, pp. 303-4) – it reveals a very important 
fact, which has often been neglected by philosophical inquiry: the cognitive function 
of feelings and desires. In Meinong’s view, there are specific forms and characteris-
tics of the objects, which we apprehend through our emotions and desires, but this 
fact does not render them subjective. Therefore, emotions possess a cognitive func-
tion. Such forms and features of the objects are not apparent, but effective. One can-
not assign value to something if one does not feel emotions. Feelings and desires are 
logically prior to value assignment, but objects, or the aspects of objects, that such 
emotional experiences allow us to discover, are independent of the fact that they are 
the matter of our emotions. 
Unlike Veber, Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought. His the-
ories about it are found in wider contexts regarding the theory of values. Undoubted-
ly, his most important text on this matter, even in the opinion of Meinong himself, is 
Über emotionale Präsentation. This work presupposes Meinong’s mature reflection, 
that is the object theory exposed not only in Über Gegenstandstheorie (1904) and 
Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften (1906-07), 
but especially in Über Annahmen (1910) and Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlich-
keit (1915). In order to understand Meinong’s mature ideas about the ought, one 
should know at least the general outlines of object theory, above all because he does 
not use shared words and concepts, but his own terminology and his own concepts. 
One can talk about object theory without considering value theory, but not vice versa. 
Here, I assume that the main object-theoretic concepts are known.10 
In Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-Theorie (1894), 
Meinong defines value by means of psychological analysis. (GA III, 1894, pp. 16, 
19) Value is the capacity of an object to arouse in a subject the foundation for a feel-
                                                 
9 Veber’s (1972) own autobiographical memories are an interesting source on the relationship between 
himself and Meinong. Some information on the relationship between Veber and Schwarz is provided by 
Gombocz (2001, pp. 264-6). Schwarz (1934, pp. 8 ff., 74 ff. and passim) directly deals with Veber’s 
Sistem filozofije (1921) and Etika (1923). 
10 I gave an introduction to object theory in Raspa (2008). 
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ing of value (i.e. a feeling of pleasure or pain in relation to the existence or non-
existence of something). There are no absolute values, but only values for a subject 
for whom they are values. (GA III, 1894, p. 42) The ought designates a complex fact, 
namely the presence of a will or a desire directed towards an act or a volition. The 
moral ought presents degrees of intensity which go from correct to meritorious, to 
allowable, down to reprehensible. The ought par excellence is correctness, the non-
ought (Nicht-Sollen) belongs to the field of the reprehensible. It is a social need that 
people should act correctly and not reprehensibly. Heroes are not needed: the merito-
rious is a weak ought, just as the allowable is a weak non-ought. (GA III, 1894, pp. 
196-7) 
The ought is a phenomenon of value and lies in the value of moral volition, 
which is qualified not in relation to the acting subject, but rather to a community. The 
dispositional value can push the acting subject to the greatest sacrifice; however, the 
actuality value (Actualitätswert) imposed by the community is content with minor 
sacrifices. He who fulfils his everyday duties actualizes for the community a very 
important value, which is greater than the effort it costs him. The true social need for 
morality is limited to requiring the correct and to omitting the reprehensible. 
Whence, then, does the ought draw its authoritative nature? Well, every ought refers 
to the future, it cannot concern the past. The authoritative nature of the ought lies in a 
decision proposed to the acting subject by a collective evaluation. The field of the 
ought, which extends to the correct, corresponds to duty (Pflicht); the correlative of 
duty is the law (Recht) (GA III, 1894, p. 205). 
With “Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen 
Werttheorie” Meinong abandons psychologism and impresses an objectivistic turn to 
his value theory, introducing, besides the concept of personal value, i.e. a value 
which is related to the subject, that of impersonal or absolute value. This is a clear 
change with respect to 1894, to which he came by means of the notion of emotional 
presentation. The function of presenting an object to the thought – he says – has so 
far rightly been ascribed to representations, but it was a mistake to ascribe it to repre-
sentations alone. Judgments and assumptions too, and even emotional experiences, 
namely feelings and desires, can play this role (since each mental phenomenon has 
an object). (GA III, 1912, p. 278). 
 
Thus, […] an object has a value not because the interest of a subject is turned to it, but firstly be-
cause it deserves this interest. Or else, put more simply: an object has a value, insofar as whatever 
has to be presented by value experiences actually pertains to it; and therein lies an even simpler 
definition: value is what is presented by means of value experiences. By itself, of course, an ob-
ject presented through emotions is as little an experience as an object presented intellectually. 
Value as I understand it is thus apprehended by means of an experience like all that is apprehend-
ed, yet by its nature it no longer has any relationship to an experience: it is neither personal, nor 
relative; hence, it can be termed impersonal or even absolute. (GA III, 1912, p. 280) 
 
In the same essay Meinong reasserts one thesis, which he already maintained 
in 1894 (GA III, 1894, pp. 27-8) and which we will also find in Veber: it is not possi-
ble to desire something which, even though it possesses value, according to own’s 
conviction does already exist. Desire is not the value experience (Werterlebnis) par 
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excellence, nor is it the peculiar way in which the subject relates to the object of 
value, but it is not even fully extraneous to it. (GA III, 1912, p. 272) 
I said that Über emotionale Präsentation contains Meinong’s mature value 
theory, which is developed from the perspective of object theory. The starting point 
of this work is the theory of presentation, according to which mental experiences, 
mostly those parts of the experiences which are the contents, present objects to the 
thought, that is, they present objects to us. (GA III, 1917, p. 287 ff. [1972, p. 3 ff.]) 
We know that mental experiences are either intellectual or emotional; so we have an 
intellectual presentation and an emotional one. (GA III, 1917, pp. 310-1 [1972, pp. 
23-4]) Representations present objecta, judgments and assumptions present objec-
tives; but the objects of emotional presentation, that is the objects of feelings and 
desires, are neither objecta nor objectives. We have seen that Meinong calls ‘dignita-
tives’ the objects of feelings and ‘desideratives’ the objects of desires. The former 
have more affinity with objecta, the latter with objectives. (GA III, 1917, pp. 394-5 
[1972, p. 98]) Summarizing, the four main classes of objects (objecta, objectives, 
dignitatives, and desideratives) correspond to four main classes of mental experienc-
es (representations, thoughts (judgments and assumptions), feelings, and desires). 
More specifically, the beautiful, the true, the good and the pleasant fall within dig-
nitatives, the ought and the purpose within desideratives. From the point of view of 
quality, experiences can be genuine or imaginary, but they also differ from the point 
of view of quantity, so that there are different intensities of feelings and desires. (GA 
III, 1917, pp. 397-8 [1972, pp. 100-1])11 Accordingly, variations occur in the pre-
sented objects; for example, there are different intensities of ought (GA III, 1917, p. 
399 [1972, p. 101]) – a thesis which will be developed in detail by Veber. (Weber F., 
2004, pp. 39-43) 
The ought shows a close relationship to desire, so that Ehrenfels went as far as 
claiming that ought is constituted by a pair of desires. (Ehrenfels, 1897–1898/1982–
1990, I, p. 544 ff.) In expressions such as ‘Thou shalt [du sollst]’ it seems that obliga-
tion is attributed to subjects, who are expected to take account of their obligations 
through their desires. But this second desire – Meinong says – is hardly essential. 
This is evident if we consider expressions like ‘It ought not to have been [Es hat 
nicht sollen sein]’ or, even more, like ‘Thou shalt honor thy father and mother [Du 
sollst Vater und Mutter ehren]’, in which obligation does not relate to a ‘thou’; ra-
ther, it “is primarily a determination of the objective ‘to honor father and mother’ 
[eine Bestimmung an dem Objektiv ‘Vater und Mutter ehren’] and only by way of 
this, as it were, can the ‘shalt’ be attributed to the subject of the objective. Just as 
with ‘may’, the obligation is also, in the first place, a specification of being [Gleich 
dem Können ist also auch das Sollen eine Eigenschaft des Seins]” (GA III, 1917, p. 
325 [1972, p. 36]) (intended as an objective). The desire does not come into play in 
defining the essence of the ought, it is not one of its constitutive elements; however, 
it is true that we can apprehend this type of property of being (Eigenschaft des Seins) 
only through that presenting experience which is the desire. 
If the desire related to the ought is that of someone who expresses a command 
– like when a father, for example, orders his son to return home – the experience in 
                                                 
11 I have dealt with these issues in Raspa (2005, p. 118 ff.). 
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question is a genuine experience; on the contrary, if the desire related to the ought is 
not that of the speaker, but is of the kind of the Ten Commandments (“Thou shalt not 
kill”), then the ought is not accompanied by a genuine desire, but by an imaginary 
one, which can however act as a partial presentation like the imaginary experiences 
in the other classes of experiences. So desires, as presenting experiences, apprehend 
objects – the objects of desire; and also obligation possesses “an objectivity of its 
own, which is accessible through presentation by desire.” (GA III, 1917, p. 327 
[1972, p. 38]) Meinong explicitly recognizes that he has reached this conclusion 
through Veber’s Wartinger-Arbeit. (GA III, 1917, p. 327 fn. 1 [1972, p. 38 fn. 8]) 
Despite the similarities, in this period Meinong and Veber disagree on some 
points. The former relates obligation to possibility, which he dealt with in Über 
Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit. The ought – Meinong says – has no application 
to the past. It cannot be said: ‘No person and no civilized state ought to identify itself 
with the assassination of the Archduke in 1914’, because such an identification has 
already been made by individuals and by whole states. One can only say: ‘It ought 
not to have been’. Similar limitations apply to the present and the future. On a bright 
day one cannot say: ‘The weather ought to be fine today’, or in August: ‘It ought to 
be winter in five months’. If the ought does not concern either factuality or non-
factuality, then it has to do with subfactuality, the realm of possibility, the bearers of 
which are incomplete objects, that is objects which are not determined in all their 
aspects, like abstract objects. And the ought has to do precisely with incomplete 
objects. “That something ought to be or ought not to be is said only of what is possi-
ble.” (GA III, 1917, p. 448 [1972, p. 143]) Likewise, desire can only apply to the 
possible and to incomplete objects, not to the factual and the unfactual. One cannot 
say (in 1917): ‘I wish there had been no war [Ich wünsche, daß kein Krieg gewesen 
sei]’, but rather: ‘I wished that there would be no war [Ich wünschte, es wäre kein 
Krieg gewesen]’, as well as I cannot wish in summer that in six months the days will 
be longer and clearer. (GA III, 1917, pp. 447-50 [1972, pp. 142-5]) 
Secondly, Meinong believes that both dignitatives and desideratives, hence 
obligations too, are ideal objects of higher order, that is, objects which are based on 
other objects, or else on objectives, that underlie them and without which they could 
not be there. This means that the good and the beautiful, but also the ought, are in the 
world, even though they are ideal objects, not concrete, actually existing ones. (GA 
III, 1917, pp. 392, 394 [1972, pp. 96, 97-8]; GA VII, 1921, p. 22 [1974, pp. 228-9]) 
A consequence of the thesis according to which the ought is an object is that, 
just as there are impersonal values, there are also impersonal obligations, which are 
not relative but absolute. (GA III, 1917, p. 446 [1972, p. 142]) On this point Veber 
agrees with Meinong. (Weber F., 2004, p. 125 ff.) The attempt to establish a theory 
recognizing absolute impersonal values, which are common to everyone, is certainly 
related to the tragic experience of the First World War, which both Meinong and 
Veber were living through, albeit in different ways. Finding an agreement on an 
objective common minimum might not be a way to prevent conflicts, since that 
common element which is reached may also be the result of a conflict, yet it can be a 
viable path to avoiding at least those conflicts which are wars. 
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III 
 
I come to Die Natur des Sollens. Compared to Meinong, Veber reduces the horizon 
of his research – but this is his first philosophical work – and examines more closely 
the concept of ought: while Meinong presents only some scattered reflections on the 
ought, Veber proposes a structured theory, which is grounded on Meinongian con-
cepts. He understands his work as internal to object theory, the theses of which are 
also fundamental for developing a theory of ought. Veber himself is aware of the 
similarities subsisting between his own text and Über emotionale Präsentation,12 but 
– as I mentioned – there are also some differences between the two authors. 
At first Veber asks himself: “what is the ought”? But very soon this question 
is transformed into another one that channels the research in a very specific direction: 
is ought an object in the proper sense of the word? This direction becomes even more 
specific when Veber adopts a conclusion of Über emotionale Präsentation and main-
tains that “objects are presented to us by experiences.” (Weber F., 2004, p. 1) There-
fore, the first task for him is to identify the experience that presents the ought. By 
doing so, not only has Veber indicated the strategy he intends to pursue in order to 
prove his thesis, but he has already implicitly answered the previous question: if 
experiences present objects, and there is an experience which presents the ought, then 
ought is an object. From the very beginning, Veber takes a resolute stand in favour of 
a thesis which is not at all obvious. In Kant’s view, for example, the ought is a prod-
uct of reason, which separates the realm of nature from that of man; there is no ob-
ject, corresponding to the ought, which is independent of the subject. 
Following Meinong, Veber regards the object as independent of its presenting 
experience, but the experience is the gateway through which we come to know the 
object. Veber thus starts from Meinong’s classification of mental experiences in 
representations, thoughts (judgments and assumptions), feelings and desires. The first 
two classes are immediately excluded: the objects of representations, unlike obliga-
tions, are neither positive nor negative; as for judgments, even though their objects 
(i.e. objectives) are positive or negative, they are all included within the dichotomy 
of being–non-being. This argument is not altogether clear. Veber’s thesis is the fol-
lowing: one can judge about an obligation, but, in order to do it, another experience 
is needed that directly presents the obligation, just as one can express a judgment on 
a colour, but one needs another experience presenting the colour, namely, a represen-
tation. Two classes are still available, as Meinong showed with the theory of emo-
tional presentation, a theory with which Veber agrees. Feelings have as their objects 
the beautiful, the true, the good, and the pleasant; since the ought cannot be identified 
with any of them, feelings cannot be the class we are seeking. One could consider the 
good, understood as value, but the difference between value and ought is sharp: while 
value applies to something that is, i.e. that exists or subsists, the ought – Veber main-
tains – is removed if the corresponding object exists. I recall that Meinong, too, 
                                                 
12 See Veber’s Sistem filozofije (1921, p. 73): “What persuaded me that this work for science was not vain 
after all, was precisely Meinong’s previously mentioned 1917 text, which – explicitly referring to my work 
which is currently unpublished – not only agrees with the main thoughts of this work, but in many respects 
completes and broadens them.” 
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maintained that both the ought and the desire do not apply to the factual. The last 
class is that of desires, of volitions (Wollungen), as Veber calls them. Can volitions 
be presenting experiences? Veber’s positive answer is based on a truly poor argu-
ment, which he calls the “principle of analogy”: if all other mental experiences pre-
sent an object, why shouldn’t the same be true of volitions, which are also experienc-
es? (Weber F., 2004, p. 4)13 Again with Meinong, Veber says that, among emotional 
experiences, volitions are active, while feelings are passive, and that their intellectual 
pendants are judgments and representations. Thus, if (i) volitions present objects, 
these objects should be identified and defined, and if (ii) the ought is presented by 
volitions, then (iii) the ought can be considered (is) an object. Veber has shown, 
albeit weakly, the first premise, he must now prove the second. 
Since every volition of an object presupposes a valuation (Werthaltung) of 
that object, one might consider that the volition exhibits the value of the object. On 
the contrary, Veber argues, since objects only have a value if they exist or subsist, 
and since one can only desire something if it does not exist or subsist, then the will 
cannot present the value of the object. (Weber F., 2004, pp. 5-6)14 It could be object-
ed that, instead, I can desire something that exists (a house, a woman, a jewel), but 
which I do not have. Here, however, it should be observed – and it will shortly be-
come clearer – that, as Meinong argued, what is not factual is not the object of the 
representation, but the corresponding objective, and the ought is a property of the 
objective. I want to buy a certain existing house, which I do not have, while it is 
obvious that I do not want to buy a house which I already have; or I desire to marry a 
real woman, not an imaginary one, whom I have not yet married, while it is absurd to 
want to marry one’s own wife. In all these cases, the desire is directed towards the 
realization of something that is not an object of representation, but a not-yet-factual 
objective: that I buy a certain (existing) house, that I marry a certain (existing) wom-
an.that 
Veber has achieved a negative result, which he had in fact already mentioned, 
but he has not yet identified the object of volition. To this end, he follows his teach-
er’s method as well as his doctrine: he allows natural language and grammar to guide 
him (as Aristotle had taught long before). The object of volition, for example when 
we wish that a certain enterprise be successful, is not the experience itself, but some-
thing toward which the experience (the desire) is directed – the desired object. 
(Weber F., 2004, pp. 6-8) Suppose I want to meet an acquaintance and I mentally 
express the wish that he come; the content of my thought is not the desire that my 
acquaintance appear, but the attribution to his arrival of what we usually (in German) 
denote by ‘may [möge]’ and that sometimes, depending on the circumstances, we 
replace with ‘let [sei]’, ‘ought [soll]’, etc. The thought I formulated is very similar to 
                                                 
13 It seems that precisely the non-acceptance of the exceptional nature of desires has led Veber to investi-
gate into their objects (s. above, fn. 2). 
14 “[…] ‘objects of value’ receive their value only through their existence or subsistence. It is however 
possible to want these objects only if they do not yet exist or, alternatively, subsist. Wanting them anyway 
when they already (for example) exist would not only be absurd, but is also intrinsically impossible. Thus, 
since value cannot be ascribed to an object insofar as it is wanted, and on the other hand, if it possesses 
this value, it can no longer be wanted, the assertion according to which the will presents the value of an 
object falls.” 
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a judgment of so-being (that is, a categorical judgment), but they diverge as to their 
matter: in the categorical judgment ‘the ball is round [die Kugel ist rund]’, the matter 
of judgment is made by the representation of the ball – there is no judgment without 
representation, for the latter contributes to the presentation of the object that judg-
ment alone cannot apprehend –; on the contrary, the matter of the judgment ‘the ball 
ought to roll [die Kugel soll rollen]’ is given by the desire that the ball should roll, 
and here the desire presents emotionally the ‘ought [soll]’, while the representation 
presents intellectually the ball. Intellectual experiences (representations and judg-
ments) do not suffice to apprehend such an object; to this purpose, an emotional 
experience, a desire, is needed. This apprehends that property of the object which is 
expressed by the ‘soll’, and since this property does not apply to the ‘ball’, but to the 
objective ‘that the ball roll [daß die Kugel rolle]’, it follows that for Veber, as for 
Meinong, the ought is a property of the objective, not of the object of a representa-
tion; (Weber F., 2004, pp. 16, 27) therein lies its objectuality. Like the object of a 
judgment, an obligation is either positive or negative, but unlike the object of a 
judgment, an obligation cannot be apprehended through an experience of the intellec-
tual life (Geistesleben) and is therefore an object of our emotional life (Gemütsleben). 
Veber has thus concluded his argument in support of the second premise, 
namely that “ought is an object of the will [Sollen ist Wollensgegenstand],” (Weber 
F., 2004, p. 14) or that it is presented by volitions (or desires). From premises (i) and 
(ii) he derives conclusion (iii). Previously, against the thesis that value is the object 
of desire, it has been observed that, while value applies to something that is, desire is 
directed toward something that is not yet. Exactly the reverse happens with respect to 
ought: 
 
If we desire an object, then we can predicate also the ought of it; if we can no more desire it, be-
cause it already exists or subsists, then it does not make sense to say that it ought to be. (Weber 
F., 2004, p. 15) 
 
Desire possesses three characteristics (positivity, negativity, and variations of 
intensity), which allow us to establish a typology of different volitions. (Weber F., 
2004, pp. 17-8) The same three features belong also to the ought. (Weber F., 2004, 
pp. 20, 24) 
Veber remarks that, “as we know” – that is, as Meinong says –, each mental 
experience is composed of two elements, the act and the content.15 These two ele-
ments are present in different proportions in the various experiences: while in the 
representations the content prevails over the act, exactly the opposite happens in the 
judgments; such prevalence of the act over the content increases in feelings and de-
sires. This does not mean that, in such cases, the content is totally missing, and the 
presenting function along with it. In volitions the presenting element is even more 
hidden than in feelings. In short, and herein lies the main theoretical difficulty, the 
act and the content of an experience possess a quantitative aspect; such quantities are 
in reciprocal relationship to one another. Therefore, volitions differ from other expe-
                                                 
15 See Meinong (GA II, 1899, p. 384 [1978, pp. 142-3]; GA III, 1917, pp. 339 ff., 347 [1972, pp. 49 ff., 55]. 
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riences as they present a minimum of content and a maximum of act. (Weber F., 2004, 
pp. 22-3) 
Veber acknowledges that the arguments he has presented, taken individually, 
are not cogent, but he believes that, taken together, they may speak in favour of the 
plausibility (Wahrscheinlichkeit) of the main thesis he supports, namely that ought is 
an object and, specifically, the object of desire. (Weber F., 2004, p. 25) 
That Veber’s discourse is based on Meinong’s object theory is further proved 
by his attempt to understand the ought in relation to some object-theoretic pairs of 
concepts: objects may be real or ideal, there may be objecta or objectives, of higher 
or lower order. But which kind of object is the ought in relation to such pairs of con-
cepts? 
First of all, since the ought cannot exist, it cannot be real, and therefore it is an 
ideal object; besides, the very fact that the ought can only belong to objectives, which 
are ideal objects and hence do not possess real properties, shows that it is an ideal 
object, more precisely an ideal property. (Weber F., 2004, pp. 26-9) Secondly, the 
ought is not an objective, but an objectum, and it is so because, while in the judgment 
that a certain object ought to be, we apprehend the being of the object along with the 
ought, the apprehension of the latter does not imply, according to Veber, the appre-
hension of a being; moreover, the objective possesses modal properties like factuali-
ty, non-factuality, necessity, or contingency, which can in no way belong to the 
ought. (Weber F., 2004, pp. 29-30) Here it becomes clear that Veber is still working 
with the dichotomy of objecta and objectives, not with Meinong’s quadripartite clas-
sification of objects. Regarding the third question, ideal objects which stand in such a 
relation of non-independence to other objects, that they cannot be without such ob-
jects, are all indisputably objects of higher order.16 This relation has been called 
‘foundation’ by Meinong.17 Now, Veber recognizes that the ought belongs to certain 
objectives, but – he adds – its objectual content (Objektsgehalt) is not based on such 
objectives, so the relation between objectives and the ought is not one of foundation; 
moreover, referring to what he has stated previously, i.e. that the apprehension of the 
ought does not imply the apprehension of a being, he believes that the will can pre-
sent the ought independently from objectives; therefore – he concludes – “the ought 
is not an object of higher order.” (Weber F., 2004, p. 33) 
I omit the long discussion of the constitutive (positivity, negativity, intensity 
variations) and consecutive features of the ought, (Weber F., 2004, pp. 34-67) since it 
does not add further arguments in support of the thesis Veber has endorsed: that the 
ought is an object and, precisely, the object of desire. Let us dwell instead on the last 
points considered. In 1916, Veber does not yet know desideratives, which is why he 
states that the ought is an objectum; later on, he introduces the class of strivings 
<stremljenja>, whose specific object is precisely the ought <najstvo>. (Weber F., 
2004, p. 133 ff.)18 Unlike Meinong, he says that the ought, even though it is an ideal 
object, is not a higher order object and is substantially different from the possible. 
                                                 
16 See Meinong (GA II, 1899, p. 385 ff. [1978, p. 144 ff.]; GA III, 1917, p. 352 ff. [1972, p. 61 ff.]). 
17 See Meinong (GA II, 1899, p. 399 [1978, p. 153]). 
18 On Veber’s mature ethical conceptions see Juhant (2005), Strahovnik (2005) and Marini (2011, pp. 67 
ff., 145 ff.). 
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Concerning the former point, Veber assimilates the ought to beauty and value, which 
Meinong regards instead as objects of higher order. (On this issue he came into con-
troversy with Witasek19). According to Meinong, if an object requires a bearer in 
order to be there, then it is an object of higher order; and if the ought is there only 
when there is an object to which it applies, then it is an object of higher order too. As 
for the other point, if the ought has nothing to do with the realm of possibility, then it 
does not possess modal properties, and therefore it does not fall – contrary to 
Meinong’s claim – in the realm of subfactuality, which is peculiar to possibility. 
If the pupil and the teacher disagree on these issues, it should however be suf-
ficiently clear that Die Natur des Sollens stimulated Meinong to postulate a specific 
object for desires, just as Über emotionale Präsentation was to stimulate Veber to 
deepen his research on both the ought and ethics in general. A very fruitful dialectical 
exchange was established between Meinong and the young Veber, an example of 
scientific collaboration among scholars, which may be taken as a model and should 
be further investigated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 I dealt with this topic in Raspa (2006, p. 72 ff.; 2010, p. 36 ff). 
